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I. INTRODUGHON
The promotion and protection of human rights' is a universally es-
poused ideal. Yet, at the present time approximately one-third of the
nations of the world engage in the systematic practice of torture,2 per-
haps the most egregious of all human rights violations apart from geno-
cide. Currently, there is little the world community can do to deter such
abhorrent practices except to expose the perpetrators to the glare of neg-
ative publicity.
This Note will explore a number of proposals designed to help en-
force human rights standards. Section II recounts the historical efforts to
establish a "permanent Nuremberg," an international criminal court
where human rights violations can be prosecuted. The existing Interna-
tional Court of Justice at the Hague has jurisdiction only over disputes
between nations and rarely deals with human rights issues.3 Thus, a need
exists for a tribunal where individuals may seek justice for human rights
violations when they have exhausted all available legal remedies in their
own countries. A comprehensive scheme for the adjudication of all dis-
putes of this nature in one centralized court, uniformly applying interna-
tional law, would be the fairest and most practical way to handle the
problem. Unfortunately, this ambitious and far reaching proposal does
not have the support of any government. Thus, Section II also discusses
the obstacles to the creation of an international criminal court and at-
tempts to answer the objections that have been raised to it.
In the absence of an international court to adjudicate human rights
disputes, a lesser and perhaps more realistic alternative is to promote
individualized solutions geared to specific regions of the world or to par-
ticular types of human rights violations. Section III of this Note will
explore a number of these possibilities. For example, in the United States
the precedent setting Filartiga case4 has brought about a significant
change in the way that United States courts view international human
rights standards. Additionally, Filartiga has inspired a bill in the United
1. A comprehensive listing of basic human rights can be found in the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
2. AMNESTY INT'L, TORTURI IN THE EIGHTIEs 2 (1984). "Torture constitutes an ag-
gravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Dec-
laration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, annex, art. 1(2), G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 91, 91, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975).
3. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 34, 59 Stat. 1055, 1059, T.S. No. 903,
3 Bevans 1179, 1186; see also U.N. CHARTER ch. XIV. The Statute of the ICJ is annexed to
the Charter of the United Nations.
4. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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States Congress providing for the seizure of assets of persons residing in
the United States who have committed torture abroad.5 In the absence
of a centralized court with the power to award and collect damages, eco-
nomic sanctions can provide an effective deterrent to human rights viola-
tions, particularly if imposed by many countries. Other suggested
solutions noted in section III include the proposal for a United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights, the establishment of independent
regional human rights courts such as those already in existence in Eu-
rope, Latin America, and Africa, and the use of public pressure to em-
barrass governments into observing basic human rights norms.
II. PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL COURT FOR
ADJUDICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
DISPUTES
A. Background
The history of international law is closely intertwined with the his-
tory of human rights law. The first recorded international judicial as-
sembly, a military tribunal held in 1474 in Breisach, Germany, focused
on human rights issues.6 The commander of the military occupation of
Breisach was tried before a court of the Holy Roman Empire for his ill
treatment of the civilian population.7 The law of war, culminating in the
Geneva Conventions,' the law of the sea, which was originally based par-
tially on anti-piracy laws,9 and the relatively recent recognition of slavery
as an international crime"0 are all examples of international human rights
5. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1988, H.R. 1417, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 134 CONG.
Rnc. H9,692 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1988) [hereinafter TVPA]. The Act amends the UN Participa-
tion Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. §§ 287-287e). The bill is now in the Senate Judiciary Committee.
6. See 2 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNA-
TIONAL CouRTs AND TRIBUNALS 462-63 (1968).
7. See id
8. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S.
31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363,
75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No.
3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; see also Miller, Far Beyond Nuremberg: Steps Toward International
Criminal Jurisdiction, 61 Ky. L.J. 925, 926 (1972-1973).
9. See I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 590 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955).
10. General Act of the Conference of Berlin, Feb. 26, 1885, ch. II, art. 9, 1886 Gr. Brit.
T.S. No. 8 (Cmd. 4789).
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issues that have been instrumental in the development of international
law.
The first major international tribunal in history was the Permanent
Court of International Justice (PCIJ), established as an organ of the
League of Nations in 1920 in the wake of World War 11 The PCIJ was
dissolved with the advent of World War II but was replaced by the Inter-
national Court of Justice (ICJ) after the war. Like the ICJ today, the
PCIJ had jurisdiction over disputes between nations. 12 The idea of an
international criminal court operating alongside the PCIJ was first raised
in 1920 by the Advisory Committee of Jurists for the League of Nations.
The idea was immediately rejected as premature.13 However, in 1924 the
International Association for Penal Law was established' 4 and in 1928 a
special commission of the Association approved a draft statute for an
international criminal court. 5 The draft was written by Vespasian V.
Pella, the president of the Association.' 6 At the request of the Associa-
tion, Pella also wrote an accompanying draft criminal code that was pub-
lished in 1935.17 Largely due to the efforts of Pella and his colleagues, in
1937 the League of Nations adopted the Convention Against Terrorism
which included a statute for an international criminal court, 8 but the
Convention never entered into force' 9 and the League of Nations was
subsequently disbanded due to the outbreak of World War 11.20
The concept of an international criminal court continued to be dis-
cussed during World War II, and these discussions paved the way for the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg which followed the war.21
Twenty-one Nazi leaders were convicted at Nuremberg for crimes
against humanity.2 2 This was the first time in history that a legal institu-
11. See Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Dec. 13, 1920, 6 L.N.T.S.
379.
12. Id. art. 34, at 403.
13. Bridge, The Case for an International Court of Criminal Justice and the Formulation
of International Criminal Law, 13 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1255, 1267 (1964).
14. M.C. BASSIOUNI, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND DRAFT STAT-
UTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL, at xi (1987).
15. Id. at xii.
16. Id.; Bridge, supra note 13, at 1267.
17. M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 14, at xii.
18. Final Act of the International Conference on the Repression of Terrorism, part 1(2),
League of Nations Doc. C.255.1937.V; see 5-6 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 308 (1937).
19. M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 14, at 2.
20. Id.
21. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, in Agreement for the Prosecution
and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S.
279, 284, 59 Stat. 1544, 1546, E.A.S. No. 472 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter].
22. R. DRINAN, CRY OF THE OPPRESSED 32 (1987).
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tion held individuals accountable for human rights violations.2 3 In 1946
after the Nuremberg tribunal was disbanded, the United Nations General
Assembly unanimously adopted the Nuremberg Principles.24 The Nu-
remberg Principles were revolutionary not only because they held indi-
viduals accountable for violations of international law,25 but also because
they declared that individuals could no longer be permitted to use the
defense that they were following the orders of superiors.26
In 1948 the UN General Assembly adopted the Genocide Conven-
tion which called for an "international penal tribunal" in which persons
responsible for genocide could be tried.27 The General Assembly subse-
quently appointed a committee to produce a draft statute for an interna-
tional criminal court.28 That committee published a draft statute in
195129 and a revised draft statute in 1954.30 Later in 1954 the Interna-
tional Law Commission (ILC)31 completed and submitted its own Draft
Code of International Criminal Offenses to the General Assembly.
3 2
Article 2 of the ILC Draft Code addresses the crime of "aggression"
but does not define it.33 Unfortunately, in 1954 and again in 1957 the
General Assembly conditioned further discussion of an international
criminal court on the finding of a definition of "aggression" that would
be satisfactory to all UN members. This became a politically charged
23. d at 32-33.
24. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognized by the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95 (I), U.N. Doe. A/64/Add.1 (1947). The International
Law Commission subsequently adopted the Principles of International Law Recognized in the
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 12) at 11, 12, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950).
25. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 21, art. 6, at 288, 59 Stat. at 1547.
26. Id art. 8, 59 Stat. at 1548.
27. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, art. 6, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 282. Alternatively, the Convention called for a "competent state
tribunal." IdL
28. Bridge, supra note 13, at 1268.
29. Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court (Annex to the Report of the Commit-
tee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, 31 August 1951), 7 GAOR Supp. (No. 11) at 21,
U.N. Doe. A/2136 (1952).
30. Revised Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court (Annex to the Report of the
1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, 20 August 1953), 9 GAOR Supp. (No.
12) at 23, U.N. Doc. A/2645 (1954).
31. The International Law Commission was established in 1947 pursuant to Establish-
ment of an International Law Commission, G.A. Res. 174 (II), U.N. Doe. A/519, at 105
(1948). The main objective of the ILC is the progressive development and codification of
international law. See THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION (U.N. publ.
4th ed. 1988).
32. M.C. BAssIoUNI, supra note 14, at 8.
33. Id.
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Cold War issue and was nearly fatal to any further progress.34
e A satisfactory definition of "aggression" was finally adopted in
1974.31 Not surprisingly, however, the idea of an international criminal
court had lost its momentum during the twenty year delay. In 1984 the
General Assembly requested the International Law Commission to re-
sume its work on the Draft Code that had been abandoned in the
1950S, 36 but their progress has been very slow.
37
In 1971 the First International Criminal Law Conference was con-
vened by a group of law professors in Racine, Wisconsin, with a small
follow-up conference in 1972 in Bellagio, Italy.38 These conferences pro-
duced yet another draft statute for an international criminal court, but
because the statute had not been commissioned by an official body, this
draft was largely an academic exercise.39
Independent of the work of the International Law Commission, the
United Nations Apartheid Convention of 19734 called for the establish-
ment of international criminal jurisdiction to implement the Conven-
tion.4" Several years later, the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on
South Africa of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights re-
quested Professor M.C. Bassiouni to draft a new procedural statute for
an international criminal court.42 This project was completed in 1980
and was unanimously accepted by the Commission.43
34. See Miller, supra note 8, at 927.
35. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, 143,
U.N. Doe. A/9631 (1974) (Article 1 provides: "Aggression is the use of armed force by a State
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of another State, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.")
36. Thiam, Second Report on the Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, [1984] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 89, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1984/Add.1 (pt.
1).
37. M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 14, at 10.
38. Miller, supra note 8, at 928 n.18.
39. See id. at 927-28.
40. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, Nov. 30, 1973, G.A. Res. 3068, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 75, U.N. Doc.
A/9030 (1973) [hereinafter Apartheid Convention].
41. Id. art. 5, at 76.
42. The Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on South Africa predated the Apartheid
Convention. The group was established pursuant to Resolution 2 of the Commission on
Human Rights, February 3, 1967. 23 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 6) at 76.
43. Study on ways and means of insuring the implementation of international instruments
such as the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, including the establishment of the international jurisdiction envisaged by the Conven-
tion, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/1426 (Jan. 19, 1980); see also Bassiouni & Derby, Final Report on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court for the Implementation of the Apartheid Con-
vention and Other Relevant International Instruments, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 523 (1980-1981).
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Additionally, from 1976 to 1987, Professor Bassiouni developed a
Draft International Criminal Code.' He published the Draft Code and
the revised Draft Statute in 1987. This is the most recent and detailed
contribution to the field.4' Bassiouni has drafted both the Code and the
Statute so that they can either be used as "Direct Enforcement Models,"
presupposing the existence of an international criminal court that would
enforce both texts, or as "Indirect Enforcement Models" applicable in
the national criminal justice systems of the respective state parties.46 The
Draft Statute establishes the procedures, mechanisms, functions, and
supporting machinery of an international court.4 7 Alternatively, the
Statute can be used as a model for national legislation.48 The Draft Code
deals with the substantive aspects of twenty-two categories of interna-
tional crimes.4 9 This Code could be used as the substantive law of an
international court or as a model for national legislation.50 Professor
Bassiouni has even drafted General Treaty Provisions for both the Stat-
ute and the Code, in the event of a multilateral convention that would
adopt either one or both instruments.5 1
In 1989 the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly adopted a
resolution to request the International Law Commission to once again
address the topic of the establishment of an international criminal
court 2.5  The exclusive purpose of this court would be deterrence of drug
trafficking;53 however, if such a court were to be established, perhaps at
some later date it could also be given jurisdiction over other international
crimes, specifically crimes against human rights. Even with the encour-
aging progress made in the 1980s there is no indication that an interna-
tional criminal court will become reality in the near future.
B. Obstacles to the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court
One scholar has characterized the principal objections to an interna-
tional criminal court as emotional, juridical, jurisprudential, and practi-
44. M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 14, at v to vii.
45. Id. at 69-252.
46. Id. at 70.
47. Id. at 75.
48. d at 74.
49. Id. at 73-74.
50. Id at 74.
51. Id at 76.
52. 44 U.N. GAOR C.6 (46th mtg.) at 2, U.N. Doe A/C.6/44/S.R.40 (1989).
53. 44 U.N. GAOR annex at 2, U.N. Doe. A/44/195 (1989).
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cal or political.54
The emotional and juridical objections are based on the fear that the
values of one legal system would dominate the court to the subordination
or exclusion of other values." The two major competing legal philoso-
phies, the common-law and the civil-law systems, each have their own
biases.5 6 However, an international court, by its very nature, would ap-
ply principles of international law, which are based on international cus-
toms. The most fundamental international law isjus cogens, principles so
universally accepted that they have the force of law.57 Thus, interna-
tional law is an amalgam of the commonly held values of all nations,
rather than a reflection of the values of any one particular legal system or
philosophy.5"
The jurisprudential objection to an international human rights court
has been rendered moot. The basis of the objection was that since no
code existed, the establishment of a court to enforce nonexistent laws
would be patently unfair.59 The prohibition of ex post facto laws serves
as a fundamental tenet of international law.' This principle aroused se-
rious resistance to the Nuremberg Tribunal.6 1 Today, in view of the nu-
merous draft statutes and codes in existence, especially those of Professor
Bassiouni,62 this objection has little relevance. Additionally, the United
Nations has adopted numerous human rights declarations in its forty-five
54. Mueller, Four Decades After Nuremberg: The Prospect of an International Criminal
Code, 2 CONN. J. INT'L L. 499, 504, 505 (1987).
55. Id. at 504-05.
56. Id.
57. Jus cogens is the conviction that, as a matter of law, a certain pattern of behavior must
be observed. For a discussion ofjus cogens, see generally Parker & Neylon, Jus Cogens: Com-
pelling the Law Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 411 (1989).
58. Mueller, supra note 54, at 504.
59. See id. at 506.
60. See, e.g., TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL-NUREMBERG: 14 NOVEMBER 1945 - 1 OCTOBER 1946, at 168-69
(1947) [hereinafter NUREMBERG TRIAL]; cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, § 10, cl. 1 (prohibit-
ing the federal government and the states from passing ex post facto laws).
61. See generally R6ling, The Nuremberg and The Tokyo Trials in Retrospect, in [1
Crimes & Punishment] A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 590 (M.C. Bas-
siouni & V.P. Nanda eds. 1973); see also Bassiouni, Nuremberg Forty Years After: An Introduc-
tion, 18 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 261 (1986). Four of the defense lawyers at Nuremberg
expressed such a sentiment: Kraus, The Nuremberg Trial of the Major War Criminals: Reflec-
tions after Seventeen Years, 13 DE PAUL L. REV. 233, 244-45 (1963-1964) (Kraus was Chief
Council for Schacht); Haensel, The Nuremberg Trial Revisited, 13 DE PAUL L. REV. 248, 252
(1963-1964) (Haensel was Chief Counsel for the S.S. and S.D.); Kranzbuhler, Nuremberg
Eighteen Years Afterwards, 14 DE PAUL REV. 333, 340 (1964-1965) (Kranzbuhler was Chief
Counsel for Ddnitz); and Pannenbecker, The Nuremberg War-Crimes Trial, 14 DE PAUL L.
REV. 348, 350-51 (1964-1965) (Pannenbecker was Chief Counsel for Frick).
62. M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 14.
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year history;63 thus, no state can credibly claim unfamiliarity with
human rights standards.
The practical or political objection remains the most significant
challenge to the idea of an international criminal court. The basis of the
objection is the fear of infringement on national sovereignty. 6 This ap-
prehension is undoubtedly the main reason an international criminal
court does not exist. This obstacle could be circumvented by making
participation in the court voluntary, subject to an "optional clause" simi-
lar to article 36 of the ICJ Statute.65
A broader response to the political objection is that human rights
law should supersede the notion of national sovereignty. The Nuremberg
judgment states: "[T]he very essence of the Charter is that individuals
have international duties which transcend the national obligations of obe-
dience imposed by the individual state."' 66 International human rights
violations, such as genocide and torture, are crimes that "strike at the
very roots of international society."'67 As such, they should be sanc-
tioned regardless of national sovereignty concerns.
Additional obstacles stand in the way of an international criminal
court. Influential states might not submit to the court's jurisdiction. The
United States, for example, failed to consider the international ramifica-
tions of its rejection of the decision of the International Court of Justice
in Nicaragua v. the United States.6" As the response of the United States
to the Nicaragua case demonstrates, political considerations often out-
weigh international law when states must choose whether to submit to
the jurisdiction of an international tribunal.
Another obstacle is the inability of the Third World and western
countries to agree on the definition of human rights.69 Third World
63. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK 1-276 (A. Blaustein, R. Clark, & J.
Sigler eds. 1987).
64. Mueller, supra note 54, at 505-06.
65. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 3, art. 36, at 1060, 3 Bevans at
1186. Unfortunately, the Statute does not provide the ICJ with the means to enforce its judg-
ments. This weakness in the Statute allowed the United States to invoke the optional clause to
withdraw from the Nicaragua case with impunity. See infra note 68. Similarly, if the proposed
human rights court has no power to sanction a nation that subscribes to its charter, it will be
impotent. See M.C. BAsSIouNI, supra note 14, at 181-82.
66. NUREMBERG TRIAL, supra note 60, at 223.
67. See G. SCHWARZENBERGER, THE FRONTIERS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 189 (1962).
68. Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Ni-
car. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392. The United States unsuccessfully contested the jurisdiction of
the ICJ on a number of grounds, then refused to abide by the decision of the ICJ on the basis
of article 36 of the ICI Statute, the "optional clause." See Statute of the International Court of
Justice, supra note 3, art. 36, at 1060, 3 Bevans at 1186.
69. R. DRINAN, supra note 22, at 178.
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countries argue that political freedom is inextricably linked to cultural
and economic freedom.7° They observe that civil rights are meaningless
to a person who lacks food, shelter, or any of the basic necessities of life;
thus, economic rights are of equal importance as political rights.71 West-
ern countries separate economic rights from political rights and define
human rights exclusively as civil and political rights.7 2 The source of this
distinction is the history of individual rights in western culture.
7 3
Human rights law in the West is rooted in the concept of an individual's
rights vis-a-vis his own government.74 The legal philosophy that es-
pouses the concept of economic and social rights as human rights views
government as an active participant in helping an individual to secure his
basic needs.75
C. The Purpose of the Court
Traditionally, one of the major functions of a state is to provide
physical safety and security to its citizens.76 Nazi Germany and Cambo-
dia (Kampuchea) are but two recent, horrifying examples of the failure
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Butcher, The Relationship of Law to the Hunger Problem, [30 No. 2] How.
L.J. 193, 203 (1987):
A mother whose baby is dying of disease to which he succumbed because of
debilitating diarrhea caused by massive malnutrition... would have little compre-
hension of [western nations'] insistence on the civil and political rights almost to the
exclusion of other rights. Surely it is the luxury of the well-endowed to put civil and
political rights before the life-sustaining right of food and thus to fail to understand
their interdependence.
See also Gorbachev, Real'nost' igarantit bezopasnogo mira (Reality and Guarantees of a Secure
World), Pravda, Sept. 17, 1987, at 1, col. 1:
[I]n most of the world one does not find elementary conditions for an existence wor-
thy of a human being... millions of people are given the full 'right' to go hungry, not
to have a roof over their heads, to be unemployed, and to get sick as much as they
like because they don't have money for treatment . . . finally, the basic right-to
life-is ignored.
But cf Soviets to Abide by World Court in Rights Cases, L.A. Times, Mar. 9, 1989, at 5, col. 1
("The Soviet Union announced Wednesday that it will accept the authority of the World
Court over five major human rights treaties, ending 40 years of resistance to the court's
jurisdiction.").
72. R. DRINAN, supra note 22, at 178; see also Marie, Relations between Peoples' Rights
and Human Rights; Semantic and Methodological Distinctions, 7 HUM. RTS. L.J. 195 (1986).
73. Butcher, supra note 71, at 196.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 197.
76. Kutner, A World Genocide Tribunal-Rampart Against Future Genocide: Proposal For
Planetary Preventive Measures Supplementing a Genocide Early Warning System, 18 VAL. U.L.
REV. 373, 399 (1984).
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of nations to provide their citizens with this protection.77 An interna-
tional human rights court could perform the function of protecting citi-
zens from their own governments when protection is needed. A
"permanent Nuremberg" with enforcement mechanisms could deter
human rights abuses, and when that deterrence failed, the court could
provide economic redress.
The court would be empowered to try nations on behalf of individu-
als for crimes against humanity (delicto jus gentium) such as genocide,
slavery, torture, and apartheid.8 The court would also be empowered to
try crimes that affect citizens of more than one country, including piracy,
hijacking, and civilian hostage-taking.79 There already exists universal
jurisdiction over these international crimes.80 A centralized international
court in which to try them would be a logical step forward.
The inability of individual states to obtain jurisdiction over most
perpetrators of human rights offenses is another compelling reason for
the establishment of an international criminal court; most perpetrators
go unpunished.8" A violator may simply leave his own country when the
political climate changes and take refuge in a more sympathetic nation.
For example, many notorious Nazis, most notably Josef Mengele, hid in
South America and escaped prosecution for their war crimes.82 Simi-
larly, if a person is adjudged civilly liable for human rights violations in
one country but his assets are in another country, it is virtually impossi-
ble to collect damage awards.83
Another major advantage of an international court is the uniformity
it could bring to the definition of international crimes and torts and the
77. See, eg., Rosenfeld, Badge of Courage, Washington Post, Aug. 5, 1980, at El0; Khmer
Rouge Killings Denounced by Phnom Penh Government, Reuters N. Eur. Serv., Aug. 22, 1983.
78. Bassiouni, The Penal Characteristics of Conventional International Criminal Law, 15
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 27, 28 (1983); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 702 (1987) (enumerating as violations of
international law: genocide, slavery, state encouraged or state-condoned murders or "disap-
pearances," torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, systematic racial discrimination, and con-
sistent patterns of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights); Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
79. M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 14, at 28-29.
80. Id.
81. Kassoy, Growing Support for an International Convention on Crimes Against Human-
ity and Court of Criminal Justice, [5 No. 1] J. BEVERLY HILLS B.A. 29, 31 (1971).
82. See, e.g., New Life Injected in the Hunt for the "Angel of Death" United Press Int'l,
May 29, 1981 (PM cycle).
83. For example, the damage award in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860
(E.D.N.Y. 1984), was ten million dollars, but thus far the plaintiffs have been unable to collect
it. Telephone interview with Peter Weiss, Esq., Center for Constitutional Rights (Apr. 11,
1990).
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development of standards for criminal sanctions or damages. Uniformity
would create a system fair to both defendants and victims. The current
situation permits human rights violators to go unpunished and produces
inconsistent and unjust judgments in the rare cases when international
criminals are brought to justice.84
D. Recommendation
Although existing literature on an international human rights court
has focused on the creation of a purely criminal court, this Note proposes
a court with separate civil and criminal sections. Unlike the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, a human rights court would hear criminal
charges filed by an individual against a state. A victim of human rights
violations could bring a civil suit for damages in the civil section of the
court, and simultaneously the court's prosecuting attorney could conduct
an investigation and bring charges in the criminal section.
Civil actions would make compensatory and punitive damages avail-
able to the victim, or to his or her survivors. Although it may be a
hollow victory to see the perpetrator of a crime punished when his vic-
tims' lives have been destroyed,85 damage awards would provide some
measure of compensation to the victim. Additionally, since the threat of
large damage awards would be a powerful economic deterrent to human
rights abusers, awards would provide another layer of protection to po-
tential victims.
III. ALTERNATIVES TO AN INTERNATIONAL COURT
A. The Filartiga Case and Its Progeny
In Filartiga v. Pena-lrala,86 the United States Second Circuit Court
of Appeals held that there was federal jurisdiction in a civil case against a
former Paraguayan chief of police for torture. On remand, the district
court awarded the victim's family ten million dollars.87 The court based
84. Bridge, supra note 13, at 1270-71. An illustration of this problem is the disparate
treatment of German chemical manufacturers accused of manufacturing the poison gas Zyklon
B used in concentration camps. Two men found guilty in a British court received the death
sentence; a man found guilty in a German court was sentenced to five years of penal servitude
and three years' loss of civil rights. Id.
85. Cf Victims' Bill of Rights, CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 28(b). For a comprehensive listing
of common-law jurisdictions that have some type of victim compensation program, compare
FORGOTTEN VICTIMs: AN ADVOCATE'S ANTHOLOGY 57-58 (G. Nicholson, T. Condit, & S.
Greenbaum eds. 1977) with European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent
Crimes, Nov. 24, 1983, Europ. T.S. No. 116.
86. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
87. Filartiga, 577 F. Supp. at 867.
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its judgment on the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. section 1350,
which gives an alien the right to recover monetary damages against a
private defendant in a United States court for a civil wrong "committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.""8 The
victim in Filartiga was a seventeen year old boy who was tortured and
killed in Paraguay in 1976 in retaliation for his father's political activi-
ties.8 9 The boy's father, Joel Filartiga, had exhausted all legal remedies
in Paraguay.90 When Americo Pena-Irala, the inspector general of police
of Paraguay and one of the torturers, was found living in New York in
1979, Joel Filartiga and his daughter Dolly ified suit in a United States
federal court.91 On appeal, the Second Circuit found jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. section 1350 and held that torture is a crime against the law of
nations. The court stated: "[T]he torturer has become-like the pirate
and slave trader before him... an enemy of all mankind."92
In 1984 the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia narrowly
construed the Filartiga decision. In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,93
the court held that there was no jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section
1350 because the alleged tort, a terrorist attack, did not violate the law of
nations.
94
In contrast, in the 1987 Forti v. Suarez-Mason decision,95 a case in
which two Argentine citizens sued a former Argentine general living in
California, the federal district court held that there was jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. section 1350, as well as federal question jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. section 1331.96 The court adopted the Filartiga inter-
88. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
89. Filartiga, 577 F. Supp. at 860, 861 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
90. The attorney Mr. Filartiga had hired in Paraguay was arrested and threatened with
death at gunpoint for taking the case. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
91. The original complaint was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Filartiga,
577 F. Supp. at 861.
92. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
93. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The plaintiffs in Tel-Oren were survivors and repre-
sentatives of persons murdered in a terrorist attack on a bus in Israel in 1978. Id. at 755. They
filed suit for compensatory and punitive damages in federal district court, claiming jurisdiction
under four federal statutes, including 28 U.S.C. section 1350. Id. The district court dismissed
the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,
517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981), and plaintiffs appealed. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775.
94. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 795-96.
95. 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1538 (N.D. Cal. 1987); see also Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F.
Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988), motion to reconsider granted in part, denied in part (holding that
"causing disappearance" is an international tort). Id. at 711.
96. Ford, 672 F. Supp. at 1535-37. The plaintiffs sued on their own behalf and on behalf
of family members, seeking damages based on the defendant's actions as Commander of the
First Army Corps in Argentina. The First Army Corps was assigned to the Province of Bue-
nos Aires from 1976 to 1979, a period of martial law in which more than 12,000 people "disap-
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pretation of section 1350 and held that "a plaintiff seeking to predicate
jurisdiction on the Alien Tort Statute need only plead a 'tort... in viola-
tion of the law of nations.' "9 Additionally, the court held that once a
plaintiff has pleaded one cause of action within the meaning of section
1350, there is pendent and ancillary jurisdiction over other common-law
tort claims not defined as international torts.
9 8
It was also significant and potentially far reaching that the court in
Suarez-Mason found jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 1331. The
court held that "a case presenting claims arising under customary inter-
national law arises under the laws of the United States for purposes of
federal question jurisdiction." 99
Cases are divided about whether section 1331 provides federal juris-
diction for claims arising under international law. In Filartiga the Sec-
ond Circuit confined its discussion to jurisdiction provided by section
1350 and article III of the United States Constitution."°° However, the
court indicated in dicta that the "arising under" standard of section 1331
is more flexible than that of section 1350, which requires a plaintiff to
allege a "violation of the law of nations."101 Under this interpretation, it
peared" and tens of thousands of others were detained without charges and brutally tortured.
Plaintiff Forti was arrested and held without being charged in 1977 along with his mother and
four brothers. Mr. Forti and his brothers were released after six days, but their mother, Nelida
Azucena Sosa de Forti, was never released and has "disappeared." In 1977 plaintiff Benchoam
and her brother were abducted from their home in the middle of the night by military authori-
ties in plain clothes. Ms. Benchoam was tortured and imprisoned without charge for four
years; her brother's body was returned to his family the day after the abduction, severely
disfigured from blows to the face and riddled with bullet wounds. Id. Defendant Suarez-Ma-
son was extradited to Argentina from the United States in 1988 on a warrant charging him
with 43 counts of murder, 24 counts of false imprisonment, and more than 400 counts of
torture, robbery, and unlawful detention. N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1988, at A7, col. 1. Unfortu-
nately, due to the current political situation in Argentina, there is a possibility that Suarez-
Mason may be granted amnesty. 13 HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCATES NEWSL. 23 (Nov. 1989).
97. Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1539. For other cases involving jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
section 1350, see Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246, 257-59
(D.D.C. 1985); Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 863-65 (D. Md. 1961). For the "outer limits"
of the use of this statute, in Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d
421 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd, Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., - U.S. -,
109 S. Ct. 683 (1989), the Second Circuit held that the plaintiff, a company whose ship was
sunk on the high seas by an Argentine bomber, had a cause of action against Argentina under
28 U.S.C. section 1350. The Supreme Court rejected this interpretation of section 1350, hold-
ing that the sole basis of obtaining jurisdiction over a sovereign is through one of the excep-
tions to the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1982);
Amerada Hess, - U.S. at -, 109 S. Ct. at 688-92.
98. Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1540.
99. Id. at 1544.
100. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980).
101. Id. at 887-88.
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is easier to find jurisdiction under section 1331 than under section
1350.102 However, in the Tel-Oren case, two of the three concurring
D.C. Circuit judges held that the arising under standard of section 1331
was the more stringent test of jurisdiction. 10 3 The Ninth Circuit, in
Trajano v. Marcos,"° rejected the holding of a lower court that no federal
question jurisdiction existed under section 1331 unless a cause of action
is established under section 1350.105
Additionally, the Trajano v. Marcos decision has been called "a
milestone in the legal recognition by our courts of international human
rights law.and the right to be free from torture"10 6 because it is the first
time an appellate court has held that a foreign leader may be found liable
for violating the human rights of his own country's citizens. 10 7 The court
held that the Act of State defense does not apply to a deposed dictator
when the successor government denies that previous human rights viola-
tions were acts of the state.108
B. The Torture Victim Protection Act
Currently, the United States Congress is attempting to clarify the
application of United States law to torturers. On October 5, 1988, the
House of Representatives unanimously passed the Torture Victim Pro-
tection Act (TVPA).109
An attorney with the House Subcommittee for Human Rights who
worked on the TVPA for five years stated: "This law gives notice to the
102. Id.
103. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 779, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Ed-
wards, Bork, JJ., concurring). Judge Robb did not reach the issue in his concurrence. See id.
at 823. See also Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1426-27 (1985), which followed the
holding in Tel-Oren that 28 U.S.C. section 1331, standing alone, does not create a private right
to sue under international law. Id. at 1427. However, the court in Handel followed the Ed-
wards concurrence in Tel-Oren, holding that "the 'violation' language of section 1350 may be
interpreted as explicitly granting a cause of action" even if "the 'arising under' language of
section 1331 cannot." Id.
104. 878 F.2d 1438 (1989) (unpublished) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Courts file).
105. The lower court had granted defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiff,
a citizen of the Philippines, was barred by the Act of State doctrine from pleading a "violation
of the law of nations" for purposes of section 1350 jurisdiction when she sued Ferdinand
Marcos, former president of the Philippines, for the kidnapping, torture, and murder of her
son by the military. Trajano v. Marcos, Civ. No. 86-0207 (D. Haw. filed July 18, 1986) (un-
published) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, Courts file).
106. Schneebaum, Yes: Freedom From Torture is a Legal Right, 76 A.B.A. J. 34 (1990).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. TVPA, supra note 5, at H9,692.
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world that the United States will not be a safe haven for torturers."'110
The bill provides a torture victim or his representative with a private
right of action if both the victim and the torturer are present in the
United States."1 ' The victim has the burden of showing that he or she
has exhausted all available remedies in other forums."l Additionally,
the torturer must have acted under the "actual or apparent authority of
any foreign nation." 1 3 The statute is broader than the Alien Tort
Claims Act in that it gives United States citizens, as well as aliens, the
right to sue.'1 4 However, since torture is the only basis for suing under
the TVPA, the Alien Tort Claims Act still provides relief for aliens who
want to bring suit for other torts that violate international law."1 '
Since the TVPA is not a criminal statute, but provides that a tor-
turer "shall be liable . . . in a civil action," '16 both compensatory and
punitive damages are available to the victim, and any assets that the tor-
turer holds in the United States may be seized to satisfy the judgment.
The requirement that both the victim and the torturer be present in
the United States for a federal court to have jurisdiction may narrow the
scope of the TVPA, but a trial in absentia would offend American princi-
ples of due process 7 and fundamental principles of international law.""
If the TVPA passes the Senate, it may inspire other countries to pass
similar laws, thus making it difficult for perpetrators of torture to travel
or acquire assets outside of their own countries. In the absence of an
international criminal court, economic pressure may be the most effective
deterrent." 9
C. A United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
In 1947 Ren6 Cassin, one of the authors of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, proposed the idea of an Attorney-General for
110. Telephone interview with Bernadette Paolo, attorney with the House Subcommittee
for Human Rights (Oct. 10, 1988).
111. TVPA, supra note 5.
112. Id. § 2, at H9,692.
113. Id.
114. "Every person who.., subjects any person to torture or extrajudicial killing shall be
liable ... " Id. (emphasis added).
115. A U.S. citizen may sue a federal or state official under existing law. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1979); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
116. TVPA, supra note 5, § 2, at H9,692.
117. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577-84 (1975); see also In re Dennis, 51 Cal. 2d 666, 335
P.2d 657 (1959).
118. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, art. 10, at 73.
119. R. DRINAN, supra note 22, at 56.
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Human Rights in the United Nations. 20 The proposal failed to gain
much support because of its complexity. 2 ' In 1949 the idea resurfaced
as a proposal for a United Nations High Commissioner and was
presented to the Commission on Human Rights by the Consultative
Council of Jewish Organizations, a nongovernmental organization.
1 22
Since 1949 the concept has been revived and abandoned many times,
much like the idea of an international criminal court. 121 In 1967 the
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ESC) passed a reso-
lution recommending that the General Assembly adopt an ESC draft res-
olution for a UN High Commissioner of Human Rights.1 24 Although
the General Assembly never adopted the draft resolution, it probably re-
mains the best working proposal. 125
The High Commissioner would promote, rather than enforce and
protect, human rights.126 The creation of the office is an initial step to-
ward "more formal techniques of enforcement" and, ultimately, toward
the "Utopian dream" of an international criminal court.1 27 The High
Commissioner could be "a catalyst for the creation of international law
by the collective process."
1 21
The ESC draft lists several functions of the High Commissioner.
First, the High Commissioner would "give advice and assistance" to the
various organs of the United Nations.129 The Commissioner's office
would investigate all allegations of human rights abuses, a role similar to
the one played by the 1963 UN fact finding mission to Vietnam that
investigated the Diem government's alleged mistreatment of
Buddhists. 
1 30
Second, the High Commission would "render assistance and serv-
120. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.4/1 (Hum. Rts. Comm'n) (Dec. 6, 1947).
121. R. CLARK, A UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 39-40
(1972).
122. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/NGO/6 (Hum. Rts. Comm'n) (1950).
123. For a brief synopsis of the history, see R. DRINAN, supra note 22, at 174-79.
124. E.S.C. Res. 1237, 42 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 18, U.N. Doc. E/4393 (1967)
[hereinafter ESC Draft].
125. In spite of the fact that it is worded in such a way that it can be interpreted either very
broadly or very narrowly. R. CLARK, supra note 121, at 60. Unfortunately, this vagueness has
aroused suspicion on at least one occasion: see the comments of the Czechoslovak delegate
that "'by clever manipulation' the High Commissioner, once appointed, might 'exercise pow-
ers which were not vested by the Charter in any organ.'" U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/ SR.573, at 5
(1967).
126. R. CLARK, supra note 121, at 62-63.
127. Id at 151.
128. Id. at 148-51.
129. ESC Draft, supra note 124, para. 2(a), at 18.
130. R. CLARK, supra note 121, at 66-67. The mission was aborted before completion by
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ices to any State Member of the United Nations... or to any State party
to the Statute of the International Court of Justice." 131
Third, the High Commissioner would have "access to communica-
tions concerning human fights, addressed to the United Nations... and
[the Commissioner] may, whenever he deems it appropriate, bring [the
communications] to the attention of the Government of any of the
[Member] States." 132 This provision is controversial. Many nations
would construe it narrowly, limiting this function to the receipt and dis-
tribution of information.133 Other nations would interpret it broadly, so
that if the High Commissioner saw a consistent pattern of human rights
violations he could apply political pressure to the country where the vio-
lations were taking place.I3 4 Another potential duty under this provision
would be to bring the Geneva Conventions and the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights to the attention of warring nations. 135 Addition-
ally, the role of the Commissioner might include addressing appeals to
governments on behalf of persons imprisoned or sentenced to death for
political offenses and attending or sending representatives to observe
political trials.
136
Fourth, the High Commissioner would "report to the General As-
sembly ... on developments in the field of human rights,. . . including
his evaluation of significant progress and problems."' 137 If serious human
rights violations were brought to the High Commissioner's attention, he
could first try to resolve the problem by way of quiet diplomatic over-
tures. These overtures would have considerable leverage because the sit-
uation could potentially be publicized to the world community through
the UN General Assembly. 138 Dr. Morris Abram, former United States
representative to the Commission on Human Rights, states: "Despite the
harsh realities of power politics, world opinion is a force to be reckoned
with. Governments do devote much time and energy, both in and out of
the UN, to defending and embellishing their own human-rights image
the coup which toppled the Diem government, but is said to have set a valuable precedent in
future missions of the same type. Id.
131. ESC Draft, supra note 124, para. 2(b), at 18.
132, Id. para. 2(c), at 18.
133. R. CLARK, supra note 121, at 75-78.
134. Id. at 78.
135. Human Rights in Armed Conflict, 21 BULL. INT'L COMM. JURISTS 1, 5 (1964). At
present, the International Red Cross brings the Geneva Conventions to the attention of the
belligerents. See R. CLARK, supra note 121, at 79.
136. R. CLARK, supra note 121, at 80-82.
137. ESC Draft, supra note 124, para. 2(d), at 18.
138. R. CLARK, supra note 121, at 82-90.
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and demeaning that of others."1 39
Although the proposal for a High Commissioner is a far less com-
prehensive solution to the problem of human rights violations than the
international human rights court proposal, and therefore is perhaps more
palatable to those states that fear infringement of their national sover-
eignty, the resistance it has met in the United Nations makes the pros-
pect of any consensus seem very remote.
D. Regional Courts Independent of the United Nations
Absent leadership from the UN, individuals must look to other
sources for redress of grievances and protection. The various regional
human rights courts of the world provide some assistance for those fortu-
nate enough to live within their jurisdictions.
1. The European Court of Human Rights
In 1953 the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention) entered into
force."4 A citizen may bring his own government before the European
Commission for human rights violations; thus, the European system pro-
vides a small working model for the proposed international human rights
court. 141 Because the governments of Western Europe "are like-minded
and have a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedoms, and
the rule of law," it has been relatively easy for them to work together
towards a common goal.' 42 However, the European Convention was
drafted after World War II, a bitter and brutal war in which thirty-six
million lives were lost.1 43 Europe is not as homogeneous as perhaps it
appears, and the establishment of the European Convention is a signifi-
cant example of diverse cultures working together to create a transna-
tional human rights tribunal.
The European Convention is both an international agreement be-
tween nations and its own legal system.'" The two bodies of the legal
system are the Commission and the European Court of Human
139. Abram, The U.N. and Human Rights, 47 FOREIGN AFF. 363, 371 (1969) (emphasis in
original).
140. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention].
141. Idk art. 25(1), at 236, 238 (with three states not participating: Cyprus, Malta, and
Turkey).
142. Id. preamble, at 222, 224.
143. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 549 (R. Lillich
& F. Newman eds. 1979) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS].
144. See generally European Convention, supra note 140.
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Rights.145 The Commission has the final and unreviewable authority to
determine the admissibility of a case.146
A major criticism of the European Convention is that ninety percent
of all petitions submitted are ruled inadmissible by the Commission.147
Another criticism is that the average length of time for a case to get
through the system is five years. This is an unconscionable delay for
those human rights cases in which time is of the essence due to the threat
of imminent death or grievous bodily harm."14
Nevertheless, the extremely narrow interpretation of the Convention
by the Commission and the Court has quieted the member nations' fears
that their national sovereignty would be encroached upon by the human
rights court. 149 As a result, twenty of the twenty-one members of the
Convention have recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the court. 150
2. ' The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
In 1959 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was
formed151 as one of the principal organs of the Organization of American
States in order to draft an American Convention on Human Rights
(American Convention). The draft was completed and signed in 1969,
and it became effective in 1978.152
The American Convention provides for an expanded Inter-Ameri-
can Commission on Human Rights153 and an Inter-American Court of
145. Id. art. 19, at 234.
146. Id. arts. 24-28, 47 at 238.
147. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 143, at 561. The grounds for admissi-
bility are very narrow; a petition is deemed inadmissible if it is "consider[ed] incompatible with
the provisions of the present Convention, manifestly ill-founded, or an abuse of the right of
petition." European Convention, supra note 140, art. 27(2), at 238. Also under article 26, a
petitioner must have exhausted all local remedies and applied to the Commission "within a
period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken." Id. art. 26.
148. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 143, at 563.
149. Weissbrodt & O'Toole, The Development of International Human Rights Law, in THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1948-1988: HUMAN RIGHTS, THE UNITED
NATIONS AND AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 30 (1988).
150. Id.
151. Article 150 of the Charter of the Organization of American States provided that the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights would function autonomously until the Amer-
ican Convention entered into force. At that time, the Commission would be replaced by a new
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. See T. BUERGENTHAL, R. NORRIS, & D.
SHELTON, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS-SELECTED PROBLEMS 16
(1986). The new Commission has now been established, pursuant to the Statute of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, Oct. 31, 1979, OEA Ser.P. AG Doc. 1180.
152. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36, at I.
The United States did not sign the Convention until 1977 and has yet to ratify it.
153. Id. arts. 34-51, at 7-10.
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Human Rights154 which parallels the structure of the European Conven-
tion. Under article 44 of the American Convention, an individual or a
nongovernmental organization may bring a case before the seven mem-
ber Inter-American Commission on Human Rights but may not go di-
rectly before the Inter-American Court.1 5 Thus, only a Member State
may bring an individual's article 44 claim before the court. 56
The Inter-American Court has power to render declaratory judg-
ments and award money damages.1 7 Until July 1988, the court did not
use this power against a member state.158 This situation changed dra-
matically with the ruling against Honduras in the case of Velasquez Rod-
riguez v. Honduras.15 9 In 1981 Manfredo Velasquez, a Honduran
student, was kidnapped in Tegucigalpa by government security forces.
1 60
He was interrogated, tortured, and then "disappeared."1 61  The court
held unanimously that the government of Honduras had violated articles
4, 5, and 7 of the American Convention, respectively, the rights to fife,
humane treatment, and personal liberty. 162 Although the government
had changed since the disappearance of Velasquez, the court held that
the current government could be held responsible for the actions of its
predecessor. 1
63
Article 63(2) of the American Convention empowers the Inter-
American Court to issue temporary restraining orders. 16 Like the
154. Id. arts. 52-69, at 10-12.
155. Id. arts. 44, 61(1), at 8, 11.
156. Id, art. 61(1), at 11.
157. Id art. 63(1).
158. Mendez, Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Judgment in tht Case of Angel
Manfredo Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, [5 No. 3] AMNESTY LEGAL SUPPORT NETWORK
NEWSL. 31 (Fail/Winter 1988).
159. [Ser. C No. 4] Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Judgment of July 29, 1988).
160. Id. at 92, 93.
161. Id. at 143-45.
162. Id. at 162-63.
163. The court held: "According to the principle of the continuity of the State in interna-
tional law, responsibility exists both independently of changes of government over a period of
time and continuously from the time of the act which creates responsibility to the time when
the act is declared illegal." Id. at 158. This holding illustrates one of the basic maxims of
international law, "Tempus non occurrit regi," or time-the statute of limitations--does not
run against a sovereign. In a later proceeding, the court awarded damages of the equivalent of
$1.25 million to the survivors of Mr. Velasquez, as well as to the survivors of the victim in the
Godinez Cruz Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Judgment of Jan. 19, 1988) (unpublished). In Janu-
ary, the Honduran legislature appropriated the money to pay the respective families, but has
sent a request for clarification to the court to see if the amount should be adjusted for inflation.
Telephone interview with Professor Dinah Shelton, University of Santa Clara (Apr. 10, 1990).
164. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 152, art. 63(2), at 11. "In cases
of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons,
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power to render declaratory judgments and award monetary damages,
the court has only begun to exercise this power in the past three years.65
Prior to these recent decisions, the court's main function was to of-
fer advisory opinions."' The abysmal human rights record in many
Latin American countries is evidence that this was not a successful ap-
proach. 167 It remains to be seen if the court will continue to follow re-
cent precedent and render damage awards against countries with human
rights violations. Recent developments, however, are a step in the right
direction.
3. The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
In 1981 fifty-one members of the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) adopted by consensus the African Charter on Human and Peo-
ples' Rights. 168 The OAU Charter is much weaker than either the Euro-
pean Convention or the American Convention. It establishes a
commission but no regional court, 169 and all of its proceedings are car-
ried out in secrecy."17 The African Commission does not handle isolated
instances of human rights violations.' 71 Instead, it may act only in "spe-
cial cases which reveal the existence of a series of serious or massive vio-
lations of human and peoples' rights."' 72 However, despite its inherent
weaknesses, the establishment of the Commission has been an important
step towards defending human rights in a major region of the world. In
1988 the African Commission held three sessions, in Senegal, Gabon,
and Egypt.173 During these sessions, the Commission examined more
the Court shall adopt such provisional measures as it deems pertinent in matters it has under
consideration." Id.
165. See, e.g., Godinez Cruz Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Judgment of Jan. 19, 1988) (un-
published); see also Velasquez Rodriguez Case, [Ser. C No. 4] Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Judgment
of July 29, 1988), in which the Court adopted provisional measures requiring the government
of Honduras to guarantee the physical safety of the witnesses, after two of the witnesses had
been assassinated. Id. at 43-47.
166. Mendez, supra note 158, at 31.
167. See generally AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1989, at 105-56 (1989) [hereinafter
AMNESTY REPORT].
168. African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev.5, 21 I.L.M. 58. The Charter entered into force on October 21, 1986
[hereinafter African Charter].
169. Id. art. 30, at 63-64.
170. Id. art. 59, at 67.
171. T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 187-88
(1988).
172. African Charter, supra note 168, art. 58(1), at 67.
173. AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 167, at 27.
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than thirty complaints of human rights violations.174 Additionally, the
Commission drew up an ambitious program of research, information,
and promotion. 175
Although citizens of Western Europe, Latin America, and much of
Africa have some protection against human rights violations, it is far too
limited. Citizens of the Middle East, Asia, the Soviet Union, and Eastern
Europe are currently in a far more difficult position without regional
human rights courts to protect them. 176 The courts now in existence
need to resolve procedural difficulties and overcome the fear of political
repercussions that limit their effectiveness so that every major area of the
world will be encouraged to establish its own regional human rights
court.
E. Publicity as a Deterrent
Because of the inherent inadequacies of all of the above mentioned
piecemeal alternatives, perhaps the principal tool currently in use to pre-
vent human rights violations is publicity, or as one writer has expressed
it, "embarrassment and the threat of embarrassment." 17 7 The threat of
adverse publicity can and does persuade governments to comply with
international human rights norms. 178 The freeing of the South African
leader Nelson Mandela after twenty-seven years of imprisonment 179 pro-
vides an example of how worldwide public pressure can eventually help
to persuade even the most intransigent government to abide by interna-
tional human rights norms.
No scientific methodology exists with which to measure the obser-
vance of human rights standards.180 Thus, it is impossible to determine
either the quantitative or qualitative effects of publicity in stopping and
preventing human rights violations. However, there is ample anecdotal
evidence to indicate that the letter writing and prisoner adoption cam-
paigns of Amnesty International"' have had a measurable effect on the
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Perhaps with the changes in Eastern Europe, these countries will eventually become
parties to the European Convention.
177. Weissbrodt & O'Toole, supra note 149, at 25.
178. Id.
179. Kraft, Mandela Termed a Moses Among Blacks, L.A. Times, Feb. 11, 1990, at A14,
col. 3.
180. See generally Symposium: Statistical Issues in the Field of Human Rights, [8 No. 4]
HUM. RTS. Q. (1986).
181. J. POWER, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL THE HUMAN RIGHTS STORY 21-22 (1981).
Amnesty International was founded in 1961. R. DRINAN, supra note 22, at 152. In its first
twenty-five years, Amnesty handled 30,000 prisoner adoption cases. Id. at 154.
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lives of so-called "prisoners of conscience."' 182 Amnesty International
has sections in forty-two countries, 183 and in 1988 established its first
chapter in the Arab world.184 In addition to Amnesty International,
other nongovernmental organizations such as Americas Watch, Helsinki
Watch, Asia Watch, Freedom House, and the International Commission
of Jurists actively gather and publicize data about human rights viola-
tions around the world. 185 The work of these organizations has led the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights to appoint a Special Rap-
porteur to investigate reports of extrajudicial killings and disappear-
ances, 186 which is another step towards the institutionalization of the
monitoring of compliance with human rights standards.
IV. CONCLUSION
Anyone who has felt outrage .on hearing of instances of torture, ge-
nocide, or other human rights violations has also felt helplessness be-
cause of the dearth of ways to right these wrongs. Of all of the proposed
ways to address human rights violations, none can be as comprehensive
as an international human rights court. Piecemeal solutions, such as the
enforcement of human rights through domestic and regional courts, have
a far too limited reach by their very nature. However, the major obstacle
to the creation of an international human rights court, as with most in-
ternational approaches to the problem, is that nations distrust each
other, and distrust underlies the concern that national sovereignty will be
usurped by the application of international law. This same fear and dis-
trust delayed the formation of the United Nations until after two disas-
trous world wars. Let us hope that there will be no more major tragedies
before there is meaningful progress toward the observance of human
rights.
182. "Prisoner of conscience" is Amnesty International's term for prisoners detained on
account of their beliefs, as well as their race, religion, or national origin. AMNESTY REPORT,
supra note 167, at 17.
183. Id. at 18.
184. Id. at 19.
185. R. DRINAN, supra note 22, at 154-57. See generally M. GARLING, THE HUMAN
RIGHTS HANDBOOK (1979).
186. The Special Rapporteur was appointed pursuant to E.S.C. Res. 35, 1982 U.N. ES-
COR Supp. (No. 1) at 27, U.N. Doc. E/1982/82 (1982). The Human Rights Commission is a
branch of the ESC.
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